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FOREWORD
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies
Institute held its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme
was "China into the Twenty-first Century: Strategic Partner and .
. . or Peer Competitor." As world events turned out, it was a
prescient choice.
Robert G. Sutter, a Senior Specialist in International
Policy with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress, presented the following paper as part the conference's
concluding panel, "China and the United States: The New Great
Game." Dr. Sutter sets the scene for his discussion of the U.S.
role in China's future by providing a comprehensive analysis of
the key factors that shape China's domestic and international
policies. He outlines a mixed picture--a regime today that is
pragmatic in its international political and economic relations
but highly protective on territorial and sovereignty issues. He
also notes that it is a regime in transition and articulates the
various interpretations of where that transition might be
headed.
But if understanding China is vital to effective U.S.
policy, so too are achieving consensus on U.S. objectives and
framing coherent courses of action. On this count, Dr. Sutter
finds several competing outlooks at work, both within and outside
the U.S. Government. His review of these suggests that Chinese
leaders will have as much difficulty predicting the future course
of American policy as the other way around.
Dr. Sutter concludes his paper with several useful
guidelines for those charged with formulating instrumental policy
with respect to China. These insights complete a thorough survey
of the major issues, interactions, and choices which will shape
the U.S.-China strategic relationship. For that reason, I commend
to you, Shaping China's Future in World Affairs: The U.S. Role.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SHAPING CHINA'S FUTURE IN WORLD AFFAIRS:
THE U.S. ROLE
INTRODUCTION
Backed by impressive economic growth and steadily increasing
military power, China's international influence has grown
substantially in recent years. Beijing's growing assertiveness in
a variety of areas from trade policy to the Taiwan Strait has
challenged important interests of the United States and others
with a concern for international stability. Chinese power poses a
set of questions markedly different than a few years ago when
China's leaders appeared as an isolated and troubled regime
following the suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators at
Tiananmen Square in 1989.
In many important respects, Chinese leaders since the late
1970s have followed generally pragmatic policies that have
integrated China's economy more closely with the rest of the
world. The result has been a foreign policy seeking greater
economic advantage in order to improve the material standard of
living of the Chinese people and to increase support for
continued Chinese communist rule. Seeking economic advantage has
prompted Chinese leaders to be more flexible than in the past on
differences with neighbors and to curb actions disruptive to the
prevailing status quo in Asian and world affairs.
Although optimists judge that China's growing economic and
military power will be moderated by an ever widening web of
international interdependence, skeptics suspect that greater
power will allow Beijing to be more assertive in backing
nationalistic, territorial or other demands. Of course, actual
Chinese policy could turn out to be moderate on some issues
(e.g., trade disputes) and more assertive on others (e.g.,
territorial disputes). Political and economic developments inside
China will partly determine whether Beijing follows an
accommodating or assertive foreign policy. Determinants outside
China include the important role U.S. policy plays in influencing
Chinese behavior.
Largely because of China's closer economic interaction with
the rest of the world, especially with the free market states of
Asia and the West, China's future is more dependent than before
on external factors. Inasmuch as other international actors in
Asia and the West generally refrain from confronting China on
difficult issues without the backing of the United States, it
seems clear that the United States will be a key determinant in
whether or not the international system constrains and presses
China in the future. Heavy international pressure led by the
United States against China could prompt the PRC to recalculate
the costs and benefits of its recent pragmatic and interactive
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approach to foreign affairs in favor of a more autarkic and
assertive posture designed to reduce dependency and protect
Chinese interests under U.S.-led pressure. On the other hand, the
United States also has an opportunity to play a supportive role
in China's development and interaction with the international
system. This U.S. approach would involve a path of careful
engagement, continuing vigilance against potentially disruptive
and deviant Chinese behavior, and encouragement of PRC growth and
influence with a goal of seeing China's power channeled along
routes acceptable and helpful to broader goals of international
development and peace.
BACKGROUND: EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS1
Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, China executed some wide
swings in foreign policy behavior. During the 1950s, Mao charted
a pro-Soviet, anti-U.S. foreign approach; in the 1960s, China
shifted to a posture antagonistic to both superpowers; and in the
1970s, Mao sanctioned a realigning of China toward a
rapprochement with the United States in opposition to perceived
Soviet expansion. Throughout this period, Chinese leaders under
Mao mixed hard and soft tactics in foreign affairs in ways that
showed a strong willingness to threaten or use force in order to
seek advantage or to respond to perceived encroachment or
pressure from outside. China cultivated the image of an aggrieved
"have not" power determined to struggle to change the world--at
least over a period of time. Beijing supported revolutionary
political movements and gave arms and training to radical
insurgencies directed against established governments.
Outside analysts were able to discern core goals in Chinese
foreign policy notably involving support for the security of the
Chinese state and its Communist Party leadership; development of
China's wealth and power; and China's great desire to stand
strong and independent in world affairs. Nevertheless, the
frequent shifts in priorities and tactics sometimes caught
Chinese leaders unaware or unresponsive, leading to leadership
confusion and conflict. Domestic politics would on occasion spill
over into Chinese foreign policy, leading to sometimes serious
leadership foreign policy debates. Perhaps the most graphic
example of the latter occurred in the mid-late 1960s, during the
most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution. This period saw a
collapse of Chinese foreign policy, amid a broader collapse of
Chinese government and party institutions, reflecting the lifeand-death struggle for power then underway among the senior
leaders in China.
Toward Greater Pragmatism in Chinese Foreign Policy, 1969-1989.
China's relationship with the superpowers and especially the
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Soviet Union remained at the heart of Chinese foreign policy
through much of this period. In particular, Soviet power
repeatedly impeded both China's efforts to expand its influence
in Asian and world affairs, and its ability to secure China's
broader foreign policy goals of security, independence and
development.2

1969-76. During this period, China was only beginning to
emerge from the violent domestic conflict and international
isolation caused by the Cultural Revolution. The Soviet military
buildup and the Sino-Soviet border clashes prompted a major
reassessment in Chinese foreign policy that focused on countering
the Soviet threat to Chinese security. As the United States was
pulling back militarily from Asia under terms of the Nixon
doctrine, Beijing saw an opportunity to work with this former
adversary against Soviet pressure in Asia. It also used the
opening to the United States to support China's broader effort to
gain greater international recognition.
1976-80. The period began with the death of Mao, the purge
of the Maoist "gang of four," and the rehabilitation of more
pragmatic leaders led by Deng Xiaoping. Deng and his reformminded colleagues began a major economic and political reform
effort designed to end the ideological struggles of the past and
to improve the material well-being of the Chinese people.3 In
foreign affairs, they broadened the basis of China's interest in
contacts with the West and the rest of the developed world from
continued common anti-Soviet strategic concerns to include
greater economic, technical, and other exchanges.
In the 1980s, Chinese leaders were generally pleased by the
strong U.S.-led international response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979. The election of Ronald Reagan and
the buildup of U.S. military strength in the early 1980s were
seen by Beijing as complementing similarly strong efforts against
Soviet expansion by U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. As a result,
China came to view Soviet expansion as held in check for the
first time in over a decade--a trend that Beijing judged was
likely to continue to pose difficulties for a USSR leadership
already preoccupied with problems including leadership succession
and deepening economic malaise.
Meanwhile, Chinese leaders began to reassess their close
alignment with the United States in light of candidate Reagan's
strong statements of support for Taiwan. In response, Beijing
opted in 1981-82 for a more "independent" posture in foreign
affairs that struck a favorable political chord in China and
among Third World countries deemed important to China.
In the mid-1980s, with the rise to power of Mikhail
Gorbachev and his reform-minded colleagues in the Soviet Union,
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China and the Soviet Union moderated past differences and
appeared determined to improve political, economic and other
relations. Leaders of both sides focused on problems of internal
economic development and related political reform, and both were
interested in fostering a stable, peaceful international
environment conducive to such reform. Sino-Soviet ideological,
territorial, and leadership differences of the past were less
important. The two sides remained divided largely over competing
security interests in Asia. Gorbachev began to meet Chinese
interests in this area by starting to pull back Soviet forces
from Afghanistan, Mongolia, and other places around China's
periphery. Concurrently, Chinese military planners began to
revise China's strategic plans. They downgraded the danger of
Soviet attack and allowed for a major demobilization of Chinese
ground forces.
The Soviet initiatives also dulled Chinese interest in
cooperating closely with the United States and its allies and
associates in Asia to check possible Soviet expansion or for
other reasons. China's growing need for close economic and
technical ties with these countries compensated to some degree
for the decline in Chinese interest in closer security ties with
them. Chinese leaders also wished to improve relations with the
Soviets in order to keep pace with the rapid improvement of
Gorbachev's relations with the United States and Western Europe.
Otherwise, Chinese leaders ran the risk of not being considered
when world powers decided international issues important to
China.
Foreign Policy After Tiananmen.4
The sharp international reaction to China's harsh crackdown
on dissent after Tiananmen caught Chinese leaders by surprise.
They reportedly had expected developed countries to move
relatively swiftly back to China after a few months, but they had
not counted on the rapid collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
and the subsequent march toward self-determination and
democratization throughout the Soviet empire, leading to the end
of the USSR by 1991. Taken together, these unexpected events
diverted the developed countries from returning to China with
advantageous investment, assistance, and economic exchange;
reduced China's strategic importance as a counterweight to the
USSR; and posed the most serious challenge to the legitimacy of
the Chinese communist regime since the Cultural Revolution.
In response, Beijing used foreign affairs to demonstrate the
legitimacy and prestige of its communist leaders. High-level
visits, trade and security agreements and other foreign policy
means were used to enhance Beijing's image before skeptical
audiences at home and abroad. As time went on, Chinese leaders
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managed to reestablish political stability. To do this, Chinese
leaders gave higher priority to the resource needs of the
military and public security forces. Meanwhile, economic growth
began to accelerate sharply, especially in southern and coastal
regions.
Recognizing the inability of communist ideology to support
their continued monopoly of power, leaders in Beijing played up
more traditional themes of Chinese nationalism to support their
rule. Thus, U.S. and other criticisms of the communist system in
China were portrayed not as attacks against unjust arbitrary rule
but as assaults on the national integrity of China. They were
equated with earlier "imperialist" pressures on China in the 19th
and 20th centuries.5
Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping's initiative in early 1992 forced
other PRC leaders out of their hesitant approach to economic
modernization after Tiananmen. Deng's call for faster growth and
less impeded economic interchange with the outside world
coincided with the start of an economic boom still underway on
the mainland. Double digit annual growth rates caused inflation,
dislocation and numerous social problems, but they clearly caught
the attention of the outside world. Many of China's well-to-do
neighbors like Hong Kong and Taiwan had already positioned
themselves well in the post-Tiananmen period to take advantage of
the rapid growth. They were followed rapidly by Western European
and Japanese visitors and traders. U.S. business interest in the
China market grew markedly from 1992 to 1994 and was credited
with playing an important role in forcing the shift in Clinton
administration policy linking U.S. most favored nation (MFN)
treatment and China's human rights conditions.6
On specific issues in foreign affairs, Chinese leaders
generally adhered to the logic underlying the pragmatic trend in
Chinese foreign policy seen in the post-Mao period:
• Post-Mao Chinese communist leaders need to foster a better
economic life for the people of China in order to legitimate and
justify their continued monopoly of political power. These
leaders cannot rely as Mao did on his enormous personal prestige
as a successful revolutionary, or on the appeal of communist
ideology: they have little of Mao's prestige, and the appeal of
communist ideology is largely a thing of the past.
• China depends critically on foreign trade, and related
foreign investment and assistance, for its economic development.
• China depends particularly heavily on its neighbors for
aid, investment, and trade benefits, and on the United States to
absorb its exports.

5

• Therefore, to buttress their survival politically, postMao leaders emphasize their concern with maintaining a "peaceful"
international environment which assures continued trade,
investment, and assistance flows so important to Chinese economic
well-being.
Thus, Chinese leaders put aside past ideas of autarky and
self-reliance and allowed the Chinese economy to become
increasingly integrated into the world economy. They sought to
avoid dependence on any one power by encouraging broad
competition. Beijing made efforts to meet the requirements of the
United States and others regarding market access, intellectual
property rights and other economic issues, and strove to become a
member of the General Agreement of Tarriffs and Trade (GATT) and
a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Chinese
leaders duly accepted commitments and responsibilities stemming
from their participation with such international economic
organizations as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and
the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
Chinese leaders remained sensitive on issues of national
sovereignty and were less accommodating on international security
issues. They did adjust to world pressure when resistance
appeared detrimental to broader Chinese concerns. Examples
included Chinese cooperation with the international peace
settlement in Cambodia in 1991; Beijing's willingness to join the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and to halt nuclear tests by the end of
1996 under an international agreement banning nuclear tests;
China's willingness to abide by terms of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and the Chinese leaders' reportedly helpful
efforts to assist the United States in reaching an agreement with
North Korea in October 1994 over the latter's nuclear weapons
program. Beijing also endeavored to meet international
expectations on other transnational issues like policing drug
traffic, curbing international terrorism, and working to avoid
further degradation of the world's environment.
It is easy to exaggerate the degree of Chinese accommodation
to international concerns. Beijing's continued hard line against
outside criticism of Chinese political authoritarianism and poor
human rights record graphically illustrates the limits of Chinese
accommodation. Continued Chinese transfer of sensitive military
technology or dual use equipment to Pakistan, Iran and other
potential flash points is widely criticized in the United States
and elsewhere. And the Chinese political and military leaders are
not reluctant to use rhetorical threats or demonstrations of
military force in order to intimidate and deter those in
sensitive areas like Taiwan, the South China Sea, and Hong Kong,
who are seen by Beijing as challenging its traditional
territorial or nationalistic claims.7
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In short, Beijing has been widely seen as accommodating
pragmatically to many international norms not because such
accommodation is seen as inherently in China's interest. Rather,
Beijing is said to view each issue on a case-by-case basis,
calculating the costs and benefits of adherence to international
norms in each case. Thus, for example, Beijing saw by 1991 that
maintaining its past support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia
would be counterproductive regarding China's broader interests in
achieving a favorable peace settlement in Cambodia and
solidifying closer relations with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Japan and the West--all of whom
saw continued Chinese aid as a serious obstacle to peace. By the
same token, the U.S.-led international moratorium on nuclear
testing had reached a point in 1994 that Beijing had to announce
its decision to stop nuclear testing by the end of 1996, and join
a comprehensive nuclear test ban, or risk major friction in its
relations with the United States, Japan, Western Europe and
Russia.
Underlying the case-by-case approach is a rising sense of
nationalism among Chinese leaders. Viewing the world as a highly
competitive state-centered system, Chinese leaders remain deeply
suspicious of multilateralisim and interdependence. Rather, they
tend to see the world in more traditional balance-of-power terms,
and therefore argue that the current world trend is more
multipolar (i.e., a number of competing nation-states) than
multilateral (a system where nation-states sacrifice their
independence and freedom of maneuver for the sake of an
interdependent international order).8
At bottom, Chinese suspicions of many multilateral efforts
center on the role of the United States and the other developed
countries. These nations are "setting the agenda" of most such
multilateral regimes. They are accused of doing so to serve their
own particular national interests and to give short shrift to the
interests and concerns of newly emerging powers like China. As a
result, many leaders in China see U.S. and other efforts to
encourage or press China to conform to multilateral standards on
international security, human rights, and economic policies and
practices as motivated at bottom by the foreign powers' fear of
China's rising power, their unwillingness to fairly share power
with China, and their desire to "hold down" China--to keep it
weak for as long as possible.
ASSESSMENT AND PROSPECTS
The above analysis of the international behavior of the PRC
in recent years suggests several key themes.
-- Chinese leaders now see the security environment around
China's periphery as less likely to be disrupted by a major
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international power than at any time in the past. Of course, the
reduced big power military threat does not preclude danger posed
by possible conflicts between China and its neighbors over
territorial disputes or other issues that China itself might
provoke. Nor does it automatically translate into growing Chinese
influence in Asia or sanguine Chinese leadership attitudes
regarding the evolving balance in Asia. Regional economic and
military powers (e.g., Japan, Indonesia, India) are among leaders
asserting their influence as East-West and Sino-Soviet tensions
have ended.
-- Regional security trends are generally compatible with
China's primary concern with internal economic modernization and
political stability. So long as the regional power balance
remains stable and broadly favorable to Chinese interests, it
will not intrude on Beijing's recent effort to give pragmatic
development of advantageous economic contacts top priority in its
foreign affairs. At least some leaders in Beijing appear prepared
to embark on a more assertive Chinese stance in the region
presumably after China has achieved solid progress in its
economic modernization program.
-- Ideological and leadership disputes have less importance
for Chinese foreign policy than in the past. Although Chinese
leaders could be divided between more conservative officials and
those who are more reformist, the differences within the
leadership over foreign affairs have appeared markedly less than
they were during the Maoist period.
-- Reflecting the more narrow range of foreign policy
choices present among Chinese leaders, Beijing's foreign policy
has become more economically dependent on other countries,
especially the Western aligned, developed countries, than in the
past. Particularly as a result of the new openness to foreign
economic contacts and the putting aside of Maoist policies of
economic self-reliance, Beijing has come to see its well-being as
more closely tied to continued good relations with important
developed countries, notably Japan and the United States. They
provide the assistance, technology, investment and markets China
has needed to modernize effectively.
-- China's overall pragmatic adjustments in world affairs do
not depend on just one or two leaders in China. Although Deng
Xiaoping picked up senior foreign policymaking duties from Mao
Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the policies followed have represented, in
broad terms, an outline agreed upon among senior Chinese leaders
who are advised and influenced by a wide range of experts and
interest groups in China. Many of these groups have a strong
interest in dealing pragmatically with world affairs. This has
included particularly strong economic, technological and other
interconnections between Chinese enterprises and interest groups

8

and counterparts outside China. As a result, they are loathe to
pursue autarkic, confrontational or provocative policies that
could jeopardize their particular concerns, as well as China's
economic progress in an increasingly interactive world. A
substantial segment of the Chinese leadership does remain
suspicious of U.S. pressure and very sensitive regarding issues
of national sovereignty.
The outlook for Chinese foreign policy over the next 5-10
years remains uncertain. Optimists in the West tend to
extrapolate from the pragmatic trends seen in Chinese foreign
policy behavior since the death of Mao and the rise of pragmatic
nation-building policies of Deng Xiaoping. They argue that the
logic of post-Mao foreign policy will continue to drive Chinese
leaders in directions of greater cooperation, accommodation and
interdependence with the outside world, and especially China's
neighbors and the advanced developed countries led by the United
States. According to this view, as China becomes economically
more advanced, it will undergo social and eventually political
transformation, that will result in a more pluralistic political
decisionmaking process in Beijing that will act to check
assertive or aggressive Chinese foreign actions or tendencies.
Moreover, as Beijing becomes more econom- ically interdependent
on those around China and the advanced developing countries, it
will presumably be less inclined to take aggressive or disruptive
actions against them.
Proponents of this view see ample evidence at present to
support their opinion. They cite, for example, the fact that PRC
leaders continue to give top priority to economic development
rather than military expansion or political assertiveness; that
PRC leaders have been increasingly flexibile in accommodating
international economic norms in order to benefit from the
international economic system; and that PRC leaders have also
shown more flexibility in dealing with sensitive security and
political issues through multilateral organizations like the
Asean Regional Forum and through bilateral talks and exchanges
with other countries.9
Pessimists in the United States and elsewhere in the West
are more inclined to focus on the strong nationalistic ambitions
and intentions of the Chinese leaders. They are often struck by
the strong nationalistic views of at least a segment of PRC
leaders in the past 2 years who voice deep suspicion of U.S.
pressures directed against China. These Chinese leaders see these
U.S. pressures and other U.S. policies, such as support for
Taiwan, as fundamental challenges to China that must be
confronted and resisted.
In the past, Chinese nationalistic ambitions ran up against,
and were held in check by U.S.-backed military containment or
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Soviet-backed military containment. Later, Beijing's need for
advantageous foreign economic interchange to support economic
development at home, and thereby legitimate continued communist
rule in China, caused it to curb assertive, nationalistic
behavior abroad. But the pessimists believe that Beijing has now
or will soon reach a point of economic development where it will
no longer need to cater so much to outside concerns. For example,
the government in Beijing may have reinforced its political
legitimacy by its record of material progress in recent years.
And China's economy has become such a magnet for foreign
attention that the Sino-foreign tables could be reversed--that
is, foreign countries now will feel an increasing need to
accommodate China or risk being closed out of the booming China
market, rather than China feeling a need to accommodate foreign
interests.10 China is now widely acknowledged as a world-class
economic power and possibly a nascent superpower. None of this is
unrecognized by China's leadership.
Whether China will follow the path of the optimists or
pessimists, or some other future course, will depend heavily on
two sets of factors:
• Internal--political stability and the course of economic
and political performance;
• External--the interaction of Chinese relations with key
states around its periphery and Chinese adjustment to
international trends in the so-called "new world order."
Internal Variables.
Developments inside China that could cause a shift from
pragmatism to a more assertive and disruptive emphasis on
nationalism in Chinese foreign policy are:
• A major economic failure or change in political
leadership. These could prompt Beijing leaders to put aside their
current approach to nation-building and adopt a more assertive
foreign policy; this could be accompanied by harsher reactions to
internal dissent and to Western influence in China;
• The achievement of such a high level of economic success
and social-political stability that Chinese leaders would feel
confident that China was strong enough to pursue its interests in
the region and elsewhere with less regard for the reaction or
concerns of other countries.
Some have argued that it might be good for Asian and world
stability if China continued to make progress toward economic
modernization, but failed to achieve full success.11 Under these
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circumstances, Beijing leaders would likely continue to see their
interests as best served by pursuing a moderate, conventional
nation-building program. They would likely remain preoccupied
with the difficulties of internal modernization and would not
achieve the level of success that would allow for a more forceful
policy in Asian and world affairs for some time to come.
An examination of variables governing China's development
and reform efforts suggests that Beijing appears to face such
future prospects. Beijing leaders are unlikely to achieve fully
their current development objectives for some time because of
significant economic constraints, the complications from efforts
to implement proposed reforms, and leadership and political
instability. Major short-term economic constraints include an
inadequate transportation system, insufficient supplies of
electric power, an expanding government spending deficit, moneylosing state enterprises, and a shortage of trained personnel.
Long-term impediments include growing population pressure, the
difficulty of obtaining enough capital to develop available
energy resources and general industry, and the slowdown of
agricultural growth after the rapid advances in the recent past.12
Reflecting these and other important constraints, the
Chinese leadership at present continues to delay some changes in
prices and economic restructuring because it fears they would
have serious consequences for Chinese internal stability. Such
changes can trigger inflation and cause hoarding. Closing
inefficient factories forces workers to change jobs and perhaps
remain unemployed for a time. Decentralized economic
decisionmaking means that local managers can use their increased
power for personal benefit as well as for the common good. The
result of these kinds of impediments has been a zig-zag pattern
of forward movement and slowdown in economic reforms.
The problems of political stability focus on leadership
succession--as principal leader Deng Xiaoping's health slowly
fades--and the difficulty Beijing has in trying to control
students, workers, and others demanding greater accountability,
less corruption, or other steps that would curb central
authority. The repeated political difficulties over the results
of the economic reforms and political measures continue to
demonstrate the volatility of politics in China.
Of course, the widely publicized difficulties of the reform
efforts sometimes obscure their major accomplishments and the
political support that lies behind them. Reflecting the rapid
economic growth in China over the past 17 years, the constituency
favoring economic reform includes representatives of coastal
provinces, enterprise managers, prospering farmers, many
intellectuals, and technically competent party officials. The
major alternatives to current policies (e.g., Maoist self-
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reliance, Soviet-style central planning) have been tried in the
past and have been found wanting. Some of the followers of purged
party leader Zhao Ziyang provided an alternative favoring greater
political as well as economic reform, but thus far no leader has
emerged with a program with viable support or constituency able
to lead China in a direction markedly different than the current
Communist Party-led development effort. Thus, on balance, it
appears likely that Beijing will remain focused on economic
reform while stressing the need for political stability, even in
the event of strong leadership and political disputes and
economic complications in the next few years. Nevertheless,
analysts are sometimes concerned about what they see as Chinese
assertiveness in the post-Cold War order in Asia.
External Relations.
The foreign powers around China's periphery and those who
have an important role to play regarding Chinese interests in
international organizations, trade and global issues could
influence the course of China's future in several ways. Some may
adopt policies on issues sensitive to Beijing that would prompt
Chinese leaders to subordinate pragmatic interests for the sake
of protecting Chinese territorial or other national claims. Most
notable in this regard are outside challenges to China's claims
to disputed territories. In the case of Taiwan, for example, if
the leaders in Taipei were to formally declare independence from
the mainland, Beijing might be hard put not to follow through on
its repeated pledge to use force to stop such a development. And
in the case of disputed claims to islets in the South China Sea,
Chinese naval forces could be expected to respond promptly to any
effort by Vietnam or others to expand their territorial holdings
by force.
On global economic issues, there is uncertainty as to how
far the Chinese government will go in compromising with or
retaliating against the United States and others unless China is
allowed expeditiously to enter the WTO.13 What is clear, however,
is that a major shift toward protectionism among the developed
countries would clearly undermine the basis of China's export-led
growth. It could lead to a major shift in China's foreign policy,
away from continued cooperation with the developed countries. By
the same token, if foreign powers were to appear to "gang up"
against China and impose sanctions because of PRC arms exports,
human rights or other policies, this, too, might prompt a serious
Chinese reevaluation of the costs and benefits of cooperation
with the international status quo.
In contrast to those who argue against heavy or provocative
external pressure on China are those who argue against the
dangers of appeasement or weakness in the face of China's growing
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strength. Even those who want foreign countries to "engage"
closely with China often add that this must be done from a firm
position. As a recent Trilateral Commission Study concluded,
a cooperative approach may not elicit a constructive
Chinese response . . . the strength and prosperity of
the Trilateral Countries--not their weakness--generate
Chinese respect. Such classic considerations as balance
of power, realism and a keen sense of Trilateral
interests must also govern Western and Japanese
thinking about China.14
Before reviewing specific areas of Chinese-foreign
interaction, it is useful to review some generalizations
regarding the post-Cold War world system that affect Chinese
actions and those nation-states and others who interact with
China. These generalizations include the following:
• The international political system is characterized by
multipolarity among several power centers rather than the U.S.Soviet bipolar order that prevailed during the Cold War.
• Trends toward
are growing. Tightly
systems unwilling to
anachronistic and in

democracy, free-markets and interdependence
controlled economic and political state
interact openly with the outside world are
decline.

• Most leading states (e.g., United States, Japan, European
Union countries, China, Russia) are preoccupied with domestic
economic development and domestic politics. There are few
strongly internationally focused leaders on the current world
scene.
• Economic issues have new importance now that security
concerns have been reduced with the demise of the Cold War.
• Other transnational issues have grown in importance
including concerns regarding enviromental conditions, human
rights, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, health,
drugs and terrorism.
• Technology and communications have spread widely knowledge
about issues in international affairs and have made it more
difficult for elites to control foreign policy decisionmaking. In
general, more inclusive, pluralistic approachs are required in
order to establish lasting foreign policies that will be
supported over time by the better informed and more involved
peoples of individual countries.15

The Former Soviet Union. The military threat posed to China
by the Soviet Union was downgraded substantially by PRC leaders
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in the 1980s and is now not of major immediate importance.
Indeed, at no time in the past has the PRC been so free from
great power military pressure and threat. Russia, the newly
emerging central Asian countries, and the new Mongolia do not
pose a substantial national security threat to China over the
near term. Beijing can relax its military guard against them.
Instability in these areas could pose a danger to China's
desire to maintain firm control of minority populated areas along
the inland frontier of China. The collapse of communism in the
USSR has also put pressure on PRC leaders to justify their
continued efforts to legitimate the Chinese Communist Party as
one of the few remaining ruling communist parties in the world.
Meanwhile Russia does provide some opportunity for the PRC to
acquire weapons and advanced technology to advance the wealth and
power of China.

Japan, Korea.16 China's relations with Japan and Korea likely
will continue to reflect the delicate balance of often
conflicting economic and security concerns. Japan seems likely to
follow policies over the next few years conducive to China's
continued preoccupation with economic development. Thus, the
Japanese appear likely to continue to rely on the United States
for security support and to use their economic might and slowly
growing military power to foster greater economic development and
peace in Asia. Japan remains China's major source of foreign
assistance and advanced technical equipment.
As part of its more relaxed stance regarding Soviet policy
in Asia, Beijing muted or reversed past vocal support for greater
Japanese defense efforts, the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the
U.S. military presence in Japan. It also muffled public support
for Japanese claims to the so-called Northern Territories,
islands north of Hokkaido that have been occupied by Moscow since
World War II.
Indeed, as the perceived danger of Soviet military expansion
subsided, some official Chinese pronouncements and popular
demonstrations registered sharply critical views of Japan's
growing role in Asian affairs. Some warned bluntly about the
danger of revived Japanese militarism; criticized U.S.
encouragement of greater Japanese military spending; and sharply
attacked alleged Japanese efforts to "infiltrate, control and
exploit" the Chinese and other Asian economies. Other, more
sophisticated Chinese views also registered concerns over alleged
expanding Japanese efforts to use economic-backed power to gain
political and economic influence in parts of Asia considered
sensitive by China. In particular, some Chinese officials
expressed concern that Japan would use improved trade and aid
relations with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to build strong
influence there as the war in Cambodia is settled. At bottom,
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however, Chinese leaders have been loathe to allow such concerns
to interfere substantially with China's interest in encouraging
greater trade, investment and assistance from Japan.17
In Korea, Beijing has worked since the mid-1980s to reduce
tensions associated with the dangerously volatile military
confrontation between North Korea and U.S.-backed South Korea. It
has seen the tense arms race on the peninsula working against
Chinese interests. Thus, in the 1980s, the USSR used its ability
to provide advanced fighter aircraft and other equipment China
could not provide in order to gain greater influence in
Pyongyang. Military confrontation also increased the risk of a
conflict which could pit China (an ally of North Korea) against
its main economic partners in the United States and Japan
(supporters of South Korea). The North-South split in turn slowed
Chinese efforts to open greater economic exchanges with
economically dynamic South Korea. China has made considerable
progress in trade relations with South Korea. But Beijing
hesitated to move faster in exchange with South Korea for fear of
alienating North Korea. The Chinese were especially sensitive
since North Korea's leadership situation has been unstable while
the country appears to be trying to develop weapons of mass
destruction, notably an atomic bomb.
Over the longer term, some Chinese observers worry about the
implications of Korean reunification. Some see a reunified Korea
as a hedge against emerging Japanese power, but others worry
about scenarios in which Japan would come to dominate the
peninsula in opposition to China's influence there. They also
worry about the economic and security challenges a reunified,
possibly nuclear armed Korea would pose in its own right.

Taiwan, Hong Kong.18 Beijing's main political concern
regarding Taiwan has been to check the possible emergence of
"separatist" political tendencies on the island that would
challenge the long-standing position of "one China" held by the
Communists on the mainland and the Nationalists on Taiwan. At
present, movement toward de jure political independence of Taiwan
is held in check by Nationalist leaders in Taipei, who continue
to adhere to the "one China" principle for practical and
ideological reasons, and by the growth in trade and people-topeople contacts between the island and the mainland since 1987,
when Taipei dropped formal opposition to Taiwan residents
visiting the mainland for family reunions and other humanitarian
reasons.
Beijing's concerns about separatist trends on Taiwan are not
unfounded. Taiwan's rapidly growing economy has pushed per capita
income to over 20 times that of the mainland. The recent
relaxation of authoritarian political and other controls in
Taiwan stands in contrast to Beijing's crackdown on political and
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intellectual dissent. The opposition party in Taiwan advocates
the right of the people of Taiwan to determine their political
future--including political independence. (The party's stance
enjoys some support from U.S. officials in Congress, although the
U.S. Administration repeatedly affirms its support for "one
China.")
The Nationalist leaders in Taiwan have modified their past
rigid adherence to their claim to be leaders of the legitimate
government of all of China. Under the rubric of "flexible
diplomacy," they now publicly pursue possible diplomatic
arrangements that would continue to recognize the principle of
"one China," but would also recognize that there are two
competing governments in China. This "one China--two governments"
or "one China--two areas" stance has been condemned by Beijing
officials as an effort to garner international recognition of
Taiwan's separate identity from the mainland.
Beijing's concerns over Taiwan are linked to its management
of the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.
Beijing has held up the "one country--two systems" model it
created in the 1984 Sino-British agreement calling for Hong
Kong's reversion as a model for Taiwan's reunification with the
mainland. The credibility of Beijing's promise to allow autonomy
in Hong Kong after 1997 plummeted as a result of its handling of
student-led demonstrators in China in mid-1989. It was unclear
what the longer term effects of the crisis would be on the
stability and prosperity of Hong Kong although the economy in
Hong Kong improved along with that of the Chinese mainland in the
1990s. If Beijing grossly mismanages the Hong Kong situation,
resistance in Taiwan to any sort of union with the mainland could
grow. Beijing also has an important economic stake in Hong Kong,
which is China's main trading partner and its main source of
foreign exchange and investment. Although there is more
uncertainty than ever as to what Hong Kong residents will do as
1997 approaches, one view among those who plan to stay in the
territory after reversion appears to be a wish to avoid
confrontation with Beijing. These individuals appear determined
to make the best of the situation by encouraging Beijing to see
China's interests served best by leaving Hong Kong with as much
autonomy as possible.

Indochina, Southeast Asia.19 As the Vietnamese withdrew
forces from Cambodia in the late 1980s, China focused strong
efforts to insure that a peace agreement in Cambodia would
guarantee complete Vietnamese military withdrawal and the
establishment of a new government in Phnom Penh that was not
dominated by the Vietnamese. The collapse of the USSR increased
Vietnamese incentives to accommodate China over Cambodia and
other disputes, and China was ready to reciprocate in the
interests of securing its southern boundary and playing a
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prominent role in the Cambodian settlement. Beijing was prepared
to pressure its client, the Khmer Rouge, as they threatened to
disrupt the Cambodian settlement process which China saw as
serving its interests in securing influence in Indochina and
elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
There remains a risk that some other power or coalition of
countries will emerge to challenge and resist Chinese interests
in Southeast Asia. Japan is one possibility. At present, Beijing
seems to anticipate a number of regional and other powers active
in the region in ways that do not fundamentally challenge Chinese
interests. One area of possible exception involves the
conflicting territorial claims of China and Southeast Asian
nations to islands in the South China Sea. There, assertive
Chinese military actions have appeared to belie Chinese
diplomats' expressions designed to reassure Southeast Asian
nations of Chinese intentions. China has also worked with U.S.
oil companies to assert its claims to resources under the sea. An
intensified territorial dispute might cause the ASEAN states to
seek greater outside support against China, setting the stage for
a confrontation in the region.20

South, Southwest Asia.21 Elsewhere in Asia, China is likely
to be an important foreign policy player, but it remains hampered
by distance and geographic barriers from exerting as strong an
influence as it does in Northeast and Southeast Asia. In South
Asia, India's ambition and defense buildup support its ability to
face China along the disputed border. But the two sides have
downplayed tensions and relations have improved especially since
Prime Minister Gandhi visited Beijing in December 1988--the first
high-level state visit since the Sino-Indian border war 30 years
earlier.
India depended heavily on the Soviet Union for advanced
military equipment. Now it needs to find other suppliers. India
also seeks to reach out to China, Japan, the United States and
the West as it readjusts its foreign and domestic policies to
take account of recent world trends. While China is prepared to
reciprocate Indian gestures of good will, it continues to supply
Pakistan, India's main strategic rival on the subcontinent, with
an array of aircraft, tanks, and other military equipment.
Beijing has used arms sales and transfers of sensitive
technology to gain economic profits and garner influence
throughout the Persian Gulf region. China has sold several
billion dollars worth of arms to Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Its
influence suffered a setback after the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War,
but Beijing has worked hard to reestablish strong ties with Iran
and others in the region during the ensuing period. Recent SinoIranian exchanges reportedly include the sale of Chinese nuclear
reactors to Iran. Nevertheless, few world conflicts lent
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themselves as readily to Chinese weapons sales, and Chinese
transfers declined sharply by 1990-91.22
Features of the New World Order: Implications for China's Policy.
Whether or not there is continued pragmatism in Chinese
foreign policy will also depend on transnational issues and
trends and how they could possibly affect China. In general,
those features often reinforce trends supporting continued
Chinese pragmatism in world affairs, or they have results that
are less than probable to produce consequences that would see a
substantial shift in Chinese policy.
The international, western-led norms of the new world order
include:

Greater emphasis on international organizations, especially
the United Nations. This trend seems to work to the advantage of
China's current policies. It assures that China, by virtue of its
seat on the Security Council, will continue to play a major role
in world decisions. Other powers that might be inclined to
pressure China will need to take account of China's U.N. role in
assessing their policies.
International trade practices. The developed countries and
the financial institutions they lead are requiring countries like
China to adhere more closely to free market and less politically
controlled economic development approaches. This puts pressure on
China's desire to follow certain neo-mercantilist strategies in
order to build foreign exchange reserves to purchase needed
commodities, including high technology, abroad. While Chinese
leaders might be expected to resist outside pressures for more
reform and transparency in the Chinese economy, they also want to
maintain access to foreign markets in order to gain foreign
exchange and purchase high technology.
Arms transfers and proliferation. Recently enhanced
international efforts to curb the sale of weapons systems and
technology associated with weapons of mass destruction pose a
direct concern to segments of the PLA and others in the Chinese
leadership. They rely on these sales for their personal benefit
and to gain the foreign exchange needed to purchase needed
technology and supplies abroad. The sales also build better
political relations as well as other ties where China's military
can possibly gain access to information, technology and other
material which developed countries try to restrict in transfers
to China.
One can argue that China's leaders are prepared to adjust to
this feature of the new world order, even though on balance it
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probably has a more negative than positive impact on immediate
Chinese interests. Longer term Chinese interests may be seen as
better served by preserving an image of Chinese cooperativeness
with the international regimes to control proliferation of
sensitive weapons systems and technologies. A case can be made
that the actual lost sales for China from such control regimes
may be small, while the intangible but substantial costs of China
appearing to obstruct global arms control would appear large. Of
course, China will almost certainly try to have its cake and eat
it too (e.g., appear cooperative but also engage in sales where
possible). In any event, the sharp decline in Chinese arms sales
in recent years--due largely to market forces--suggests that this
issue may be less important in determining Chinese policy in the
future.

Drugs, terrorism, environment. Beijing has appeared
generally cooperative in working with recently enhanced
international efforts to curb the flow of drugs, to pressure
those who harbor terrorists, and to deal with worldwide
environmental issues. Significantly, such cooperation involves
infringement on traditional Chinese concepts of national
sovereignty but Beijing has gone along with international
efforts in these areas with little complaint and often with
considerable enthusiasm. Evidently, Chinese leaders bridle at
some outside "intrusions" into China's or other countries'
sovereign affairs (e.g., over the human rights issue, see below),
while they wink at others.
Human rights. China seems to take particular offense with
heightened world efforts to press China to bring its human rights
practices into closer alignment with the broad participatory,
accountability and democratic standards followed by other
governments. It sees such pressure as an affront to China's
national sovereignty and as designed, at bottom, to undermine the
legitimacy and power of the Chinese communist regime. Beijing is
particularly concerned when human rights issues are used in
conjunction with calls for greater freedom for selfdetermination in places like Tibet and Taiwan. Such outside
advocacy is then seen to amount to little more than disguised
efforts to overthrow China's government and split the nation
apart.
Chinese leaders are especially concerned about this aspect
of the new world order. Nonetheless, a pragmatic Chinese approach
is still warranted if one judges that the ability of outside
powers to threaten China is limited. Limits are imposed by
distance, the absence of major resources devoted to this effort,
and major differences in the West and among Asian-Pacific
countries regarding how prominent a role human rights should play
in interaction with a country like China.
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ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND U.S. POLICY CHOICES
Although the United States does not border on China, Beijing
recognizes that the United States still exerts predominant
strategic influence in East Asia and the Western Pacific; is a
leading economic power in the region, surpassed locally only by
Japan; and is one of only two world powers capable of exerting
sufficient power around China's periphery to pose a tangible
danger to Chinese security and development. As the world's only
superpower, the United States also exerts strong influence in
international financial and political institutions (e.g., the
World Bank and the U.N.) that are very important to Beijing, and
its role in particular areas sensitive to Beijing, notably policy
regarding Taiwan and international human rights, is second to
none.23
The pattern of international interchange with China's
growing strength in recent years appears to underline the
importance of the U.S. role. Few of China's neighbors are willing
to challenge or express strongly different views than the PRC on
major issues. They privately support a significant U.S. military
presence in the region, partly because it serves as an implicit
counterweight to China's military power. They and more distant
developed countries also privately support firm U.S. efforts to
open China's markets, end unfair commercial practices, and
protect the integrity of the world trading system. And they
appreciate U.S. efforts to press China to end nuclear testing and
proliferation of equipment and technology for weapons of mass
destruction.24 Notably, however, this support is usually not
expressed openly.
Beijing, too, sees the United States as the key link in the
international balance of power affecting Chinese interests. This
judgement goes far toward explaining why Chinese leaders so
avidly seek a visit to China by President Clinton. It would
signal to all at home and abroad that the United States has
muffled its opposition to and endorses cooperation with the
Beijing government. Of course, as noted above, some Chinese
leaders remain deeply suspicious of U.S. motives. They believe
the U.S. Government is conspiring to weaken and undermine the
Chinese leadership and "hold back" China from a more prominent
position in world affairs.25
There is general agreement in the United States that
Washington should use its influence in order to have Beijing
conform to international norms and over time to foster changes in
China's political, economic, and security systems compatible with
American interests. At the same time, there is little agreement
in Washington on how the United States should achieve these
objectives.
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Caught up in the drama of the recent changes inside China,
Western specialists and other observers have understandably
focused on internal variables and factors as the most important
determinants of China's future. Indeed, most foreign powers, led
by Japan, Russia, India, the ASEAN states and others around
China's periphery have appeared willing in recent years to
accommodate and work with China, and to avoid actions and
pressures that could prompt a sharp adjustment or shift in
Chinese policy or a change in China's future policy orientation.
Not so the United States. U.S. policy now intrudes on such a
wide range of issues sensitive to Beijing and to the future of
China's policy as to represent perhaps the most critical current
variable in determining China's future direction.
• The United States clearly has it within its power through
trade sanctions or protectionist trade measures to seriously
complicate PRC economic development plans.
• The United States has the option at this time to instigate
or exacerbate regional security tensions over China's rising
power in ways that could seriously complicate China's desire for
an accommodating security environment in the region.
• The United States also plays a key role in such sensitive
territorial questions for the PRC leadership as Taiwan, Tibet,
Hong Kong and the South China Sea. Any PRC leadership that does
not handle these issues appropriately is widely seen as
vulnerable to challenges from others in the communist hierarchy.
Beijing's leaders' view of the challenges posed by such
territorial problems also is seen as going far toward determining
PRC willingness or reluctance to associate closely with outside
powers and develop an interdependent approach to world affairs.
• Sharp tensions in U.S.-China relations would presumably
force key countries in the region like Japan, South Korea,
Russia and Australia, and key international actors like the
international financial institutions that provide several billion
dollars of aid to the PRC annually, to feel the need to choose
between Washington and Beijing on important issues--choices with
unpredictable and potentially serious implications for China's
ability to sustain a cooperative foreign environment.
By the same token, the United States also appears to have a
potentially large influence on encouraging China to engage with
the world in a positive and constructive way. With its superior
military strength and intelligence capabilities, the United
States could take the lead in reassuring Asian states over
China's growing military power and at the same time reassuring
China of the regional response to China's rise. As the world's
largest economy, the United States can play a very important role
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in determining the most constructive ways to engage the Chinese
economy in the WTO and other multilateral economic organizations.
U.S. policy on issues like Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, the South
China Sea and other territorial questions sensitive to Beijing
could be done in ways that encourage constructive PRC responses
to accepted international norms. Similar arguments can be made
regarding U.S. policy toward trade, proliferation, human rights,
environment and other questions now at the center of U.S.
interaction with China.
In a word, a case can be made for the argument that, for the
time being, the United States has it within its power to move the
direction of PRC policy in one way or the other. Whether U.S.
policymakers realize their influence and what they propose to do
with it remains to be seen.
An effective U.S. policy toward China, whether tough or
accommodating, does not seem likely in the near future. There
remains too much uncertainty and unpredictability in the conduct
of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War environment to allow
for such an organized American approach. There are many reasons
for this knotted situation in U.S. foreign policy.
Numerous issues and variables affecting U.S. policy make it
difficult to chart the general direction of U.S. policy. The task
is made all the more difficult because the previous framework for
U.S. policy, based on the primacy of security issues and
opposition to Soviet expansion, is now obsolete. Imperatives of
economic competitiveness, democracy, human rights, and other
values have achieved greater prominence in U.S. policymaking. The
ability of the executive branch of government to use the argument
of U.S. strategic competition with the Soviet Union as a means to
keep foreign policymaking power in its hands is also at an end.
American policymaking will likely reflect more sharply the
pluralistic nature of U.S. society and the various pressure
groups and other representative institutions there for some time
to come.
History has shown that this fluidity and competition among
priorities is more often than not the norm in American foreign
policy. Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt both set forth
comprehensive concepts of a well-integrated U.S. foreign policy,
but neither framework lasted long. The requirements of the Cold
War were much more effective in establishing rigor and order in
U.S. foreign policy priorities, but that era is now over. In
retrospect, it appears as the aberration rather than the norm in
the course of U.S. foreign policy.
In general terms, there appear to be three distinct
tendencies or schools of thought concerned with U.S. foreign
policy after the Cold War. Although contemporary U.S. foreign
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policy advocates cover a wide range of opinion and issues, one
can discern these three approaches. By understanding what these
schools stand for and observing the actions of U.S. policy in
specific areas regarding China, one can get a better sense as to
how difficult it will continue to predict the future direction of
U.S. policy toward China.
On one side are Americans who are concerned with what they
see as a relative decline in U.S. power that gets in the way of
U.S. efforts to protect important interests abroad. They call for
the United States to work harder to preserve important interests
abroad, but with fewer U.S. resources and less U.S. influence
available to do the job. These leaders' review of recent
developments causes them to expect further changes in world
affairs, sometimes in unexpected ways. They see relatively
limited or declining U.S. power and influence to deal with those
changes.
They stress in particular several "realities" governing the
current U.S. approach to Asia and the Pacific and world affairs
in general:
• U.S. attention to China, Asia and the Pacific and
elsewhere abroad has been diverted by the need to focus on
pressing U.S. domestic problems.
• U.S. Government decisionmaking will remain difficult
because of the possibility that the executive branch will remain
in control of one U.S. political party, and the Congress in
control of another party.
• The U.S. Government and the U.S. private sector have only
limited financial resources to devote to domestic and foreign
policy concerns.
• The priorities in U.S. policy toward China will remain
unclear. Security, economic, and cultural-political issues will
vary in receiving top priority in U.S. policy.
• There remains no obvious international framework to deal
with foreign issues. U.S. policy must use a mix of international,
regional, and bilateral efforts to achieve policy goals.
Under these circumstances, these advocates see a strong need
for the United States to work prudently and closely with
traditional U.S. allies and associates. Their cautious approach
argues, for example, that it seems foolish and inconsistent with
U.S. goals not to preserve the long-standing U.S. stake in good
relations with Japan and with friends and allies along the
periphery of Asia and in Oceania. Their security policies and
political-cultural orientations are generally seen as in accord
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with U.S. interests. Although opinion surveys sometime claim that
the American public and some U.S. leaders see Japan as an
economic competitive "threat" to U.S. well-being, these observers
stress a different line of argument. They highlight the fact that
few polls of U.S. public opinion or U.S. leaders support the view
that it is now in America's interest to focus U.S. energies on
the need to confront the Japanese economic threat, in a way that
confrontation with the Soviet Union came to dominate U.S. policy
during the Cold War.
In the view of these advocates, caution is in order in
anticipating future U.S. relations with other major regional
actors--the former Soviet Union, China, and India. All three are
preoccupied with internal political-development crises. Few
appear to be seeking to foment tensions or major instability in
the region. All seek better ties and closer economic relations
with the West and with the advancing economies of the region.
U.S. policy would appear well advised, they say, to work closely
with these governments wherever there is possible common ground
on security, economic, or political issues.
In considering U.S. assets available to influence trends in
the region, these advocates call on U.S. leaders to go slowly in
reducing U.S. military presence in the region. The economic
savings of such a cutback would be small; the political costs
could be high inasmuch as most countries in Asia have been
encouraging the United States to remain actively involved in the
region to offset the growing power of Japan or the potential
ambitions of China or others.
A second major school of thought on U.S. foreign policy
emerged in the 1990s. These proponents have argued for major
cutbacks in U.S. international involvement and a renewed focus on
solving U.S. domestic problems concerning crime, drugs, lagging
economic competitiveness, educational standards, homelessness,
poverty, decaying cities and transportation infrastructure, and
other issues. Variations of this view are seen in the writings of
William Hyland, Patrick Buchanan, and other well-known
commentators, and in the political rhetoric of Ross Perot.
Often called an "American First" or "Neoisolationist"
school, these advocates argue for sweeping cuts in U.S. military,
diplomatic, and foreign assistance spending abroad. They are
skeptical of the utility of the international financial
institutions, the United Nations, and the international efforts
to promote free trade through the GATT, WTO and other means. They
argue that the United States has become overextended in world
affairs; has been taken advantage of in the current world
security-economic system; and must begin to retreat from
international commitments in order to gather together the
resources needed to deal with American domestic problems. As to
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specific recommendations, these proponents tend to favor a
complete U.S. pullback from foreign bases; drastic cuts in
foreign assistance and foreign technical/information programs;
and termination of various international economic talks that
help to perpetuate a world trading system, which they see as
basically contrary to American economic interests. Many in this
school favor stronger government intervention in the domestic
U.S. economy and related areas of promoting technology,
education, and social welfare. Some favor trade measures that are
seen as protectionist by U.S. trading partners.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the debate lies a third,
somewhat less well articulated school of thought. This school
generally judges that U.S. policy needs to more strongly and
actively promote U.S. views of the world political, military, and
economic order; to press those countries that do not conform to
the U.S. view of an appropriate world order; and to lead strongly
in world affairs, attempting to avoid compromises and
accommodations with others that would reduce the impact and
strength of U.S. leadership.
This school of thought has always been present in American
politics. But it appears far stronger today than at any other
time since at least the 1960s for several reasons:
• Impact of Reagan policies. After a prolonged period of
introspection and doubt following the Vietnam War, the oil
shocks, and the Iran hostage crisis, U.S. opinion became much
more optimistic about the United States and its future after two
terms of Ronald Reagan.
• Victory in the Cold War. This represented a great
accomplishment for the U.S.-backed system of collective security
and for U.S. political and economic values.
• Persian Gulf War. U.S. military doctrine, equipment, and
performance were strong; U.S. ability to lead in a world crisis
also appeared strong.
• Economic developments. Although the United States is seen
facing still serious difficulties, advocates point to analysts
who are now more optimistic about U.S. ability to prosper in the
increasing competitive world economic environment.
• Values-Culture. The United States is seen as better
positioned than any other country to exert leadership in all
major areas of cultural influences; i.e., ideas and values,
political concepts, life-style, and popular culture.
Further giving impetus to this school of thought is the
perception of a power vacuum in the world, in which the United
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States is more free to exert its influence. Thus, proponents of
this viewpoint are not deterred by the seeming decline in
economic resources available to U.S. policymakers. In particular,
the former Soviet Union, China, and India are likely to remain
internally preoccupied for some time. Meanwhile, Japan and
Germany are acknowledged to be economically powerful; but
politically they have shown themselves to be uncertain as to how
to use their new power and culturally they appear to be not
nearly as influential as the United States.
In recent years, advocates of this third tendency have been
most vocal in pressing their concern for strong U.S. policy in
support of U.S. political values of democracy and human rights.
In this regard they have sometimes argued for a more active U.S.
foreign policy, leading some recipient countries to view U.S.
policy as illegitimate interference in a country's internal
affairs. They have also reinforced the strength and determination
of the U.S. case in opposition to economic or trading policies
seen in the United States as grossly inequitable or predatory;
and they have reinforced strongly the U.S. policy against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Other areas where
they have exerted more influence involve international sanctions
against countries that harbor terrorists or promote the drug
trade. They have also pushed the U.S. Government to be more
assertive in promoting humanitarian relief and in recognizing
politically the legitimacy of people's right to selfdetermination.
In sum, it is not hard to see the evidence of clashes among
these three, often competing tendencies in U.S. policy toward
China. Most obvious in recent years have been those of the third
group who have strongly pursued human rights, proliferation,
trade practices and other issues with China. They have pressed
Beijing hard to meet U.S. sanctioned international norms,
threatening sometimes very serious economic or other sanctions if
China did not conform. By contrast, the more cautious and
accommodating first group sees the strong advocates of U.S.
values and concerns as being unrealistic about U.S. power and
unwilling to make needed compromises with the Chinese government
and others in order to protect U.S. interests in relations with
China.
The three approaches that emerge from this complicated mix
to influence current U.S. policy toward China are noted below. At
present there is little indication as to which approach will
ultimately succeed.26
On one side is an approach favored by some in the Clinton
administration, the Congress and elsewhere who argue in favor of
a moderate, less confrontational and "engaged" posture toward
China. Some in this camp are concerned with perceived fundamental
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weaknesses in China and urge a moderate U.S. policy approach out
of fear that to do otherwise could promote divisions in and a
possible breakup of China with potentially disastrous
consequences for U.S. interests in Asian stability and
prosperity. Others are more impressed with China's growing
economic and national strength and the opportunities this
provides for the United States. They promote close U.S.
engagement with China as the most appropriate way to guide the
newly emerging power into channels of international activity
compatible with American interests.
Sometimes underlying this moderate approach is a belief that
trends in China are moving inexorably in the "right" direction.
That is, China is becoming increasingly interdependent
economically with its neighbors and the developed countries of
the West, and is seen as increasingly unlikely to take
disruptive action that would upset these advantageous
international economic relationships. In addition, greater wealth
in China is seen pushing Chinese society in directions that seem
certain to develop a materially better-off, more educated and
cosmopolitan populace that will over time press its government
for greater representation, political pluralism and, eventually,
democracy. Therefore, U.S. policy should seek to work ever more
closely with China in order to encourage these positive long-term
trends.
A second, tougher approach is that of some U.S. advocates
inside and out of the U.S. Government who have doubts about the
interdependence argument. These U.S. policymakers and opinion
leaders stress that Beijing officials still view the world as a
state-centered competitive environment where interdependence
counts for little and compromises sovereign strength. China's
leaders are seen as determined to use whatever means at their
disposal to increase China's wealth and power. At present,
Beijing is seen biding its time and conforming to many
international norms as it builds economic strength. Once it
succeeds with economic modernization, the argument goes, Beijing
will be disinclined to curb its narrow nationalistic or other
ambitions out of a need for international interdependence or
other concerns for world community. When strong enough, China,
like other large powers in the past, will possess great
capabilities and will attract few friends or allies.
Under these circumstances, this approach encourages U.S.
leaders to be more firm than moderate in dealing with China.
Rather than trying to persuade Beijing of the advantages of
international cooperation, the United States is advised to keep
military forces as a counterweight to rising Chinese power in
Asia; to remain firm in dealing with economic, arms proliferation
and other disputes with China; and to work closely with
traditional U.S. allies and friends along China's periphery in
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order to deal with any suspected assertiveness or disruption from
Beijing.
A third approach is favored by some U.S. officials and
others who believe that the political system in China needs to be
changed first before the United States has any real hope of
reaching a constructive relationship with China. Beijing's
communist leaders are seen as inherently incapable of long-term
positive ties with the United States. U.S. policy should focus on
mechanisms to change China from within while maintaining a
vigilant posture to deal with disruptive Chinese foreign policy
actions in Asian and world affairs. The development of an
authoritarian superpower more economically competent than the
USSR is not to be aided.
OUTLOOK FOR U.S. POLICY
Given the continued wide range of opinion in the United
States over the appropriate U.S. policy toward China, it appears
likely that U.S. policy will continue its recent pattern of
trying to accommodate elements of all three approaches. On some
issues, like linking MFN treatment and human rights, the U.S.
Government has seen U.S. interests best served by an approach
that meets PRC concerns. On others, like intellectual property
rights protection and proliferation of missile technology, the
U.S. Government seems prepared to threaten sanctions or to
withhold benefits from Beijing until it conforms to norms
acceptable to the United States. Meanwhile, although many U.S.
officials would see as counterproductive any declaration by the
U.S. Government that a policy goal was to change China's system
of government, there is a widespread assumption that greater U.S.
"engagement" will encourage such desirable changes.
Whether the U.S. Government policy synthesis of these three
tendencies is done smoothly or is accompanied by the often
strident policy debates accompanying U.S. China policy decisions
in recent years depends partly on U.S. leadership. In this vein,
several rules of thumb are suggested that U.S. leaders could
consider when determining whether the United States should try to
accommodate, confront or change China on a particular policy
issue:
• How important is the issue at hand for U.S. interests? (In
general the more important U.S. interests at stake, the less
accommodating and more forceful U.S. leaders should be.)
• How does the issue at hand fit in with broader U.S.
strategic interests in relation with China? (Presumably, some
U.S. officials would be inclined to soft pedal relatively minor
disputes with China when they are pressing for broader gains
elsewhere).
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• How much leverage does the United States have over the PRC
on this issue? (In general, the greater the degree of U.S.
leverage, the easier it is for U.S. leaders to press for their
demands.)
• What are the attitudes of U.S. allies and associates? (If
they do not support a firm U.S. stance, U.S. efforts to pressure
China may be outflanked, Quixotic and counterproductive.)
• How sensitive is the issue at hand to the PRC? (Experience
has indicated that Beijing has shown less sensitivity and greater
flexibility on international economic issues, and has shown more
sensitivity and less flexibility on issues involving domestic
political control and territorial claims. Many analysts believe
that PRC leadership flexibility on sensitive issues will be
restricted for a time as a result of the decline of Deng
Xiaoping's health and the ongoing leadership succession
struggle).
Other matters of importance in considering specific China
policy issues include:
• How does the U.S. stance affect broader U.S. interests in
Asian stability and international affairs?
• What is the U.S. "bottom line"? Chinese officials will
press for the advantage until they find it.
• Can this matter be effectively pursued in an overall
friendly and respectful atmosphere? This reduces suspicions in
Beijing regarding the alleged overall hostile intent of U.S
policymakers toward China-- suspicions which greatly limit PRC
flexibility.
• Can this issue be pursued with the aid of U.S. allies,
associates and other international leaders to create an
atmosphere that would prompt Beijing to change in directions
favored by the United States? (The United States used this
approach in part to get Beijing to go along with international
sanctions and military action against Libya and Iraq; with
planned sanctions against North Korea; and with provisions of the
1991 Cambodian peace accord that were opposed by Beijing's former
client, the Khmer Rouge.)
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